Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object :: Philosophy Papers

Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically weak. Hence, we have no argument able to dismiss physicalism by consideration of first-person qualia (contra Jackson); however, it does not force us to endorse qualia-reductionism. In the second part of my paper I defend non-reductionism in a different way. Following Nagel and Harman, I try to avoid criticisms usually presented against Nagel, seeing subjectivity and objectivity as two complementary structures of the subjective and objective element of our language. I refer to classical German philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist dialectics which have developed a complementary approach cruc ial in the reductionist/anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of mind. "Opinion says hot and cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space." Democritus Jackson’s Black and White Mary (1) case illustrates an argument that our first-person experience of qualia provides knowledge not accessible through third-person means. This argument seems suspicious: if ‘knowledge’, by definition, needs to be grasped in third-person terms, it is inconceivable how an exclusively first-person experience may give us knowledge. Harman (92) develops complementarity of subjective and objective aspects within his functionalism of concepts. This notion needs to be extended to epistemic complementarity. I refer to Classical German Philosophy, Phenomenology and Marxism which have developed a complementary approach crucial in the reductionist anti-reductionist controversy in philosophy of mind. I. The Knowledge Argument As Jackson (86) emphasizes in his polemics with Churchland (85) the main point of the case of Black and White Mary is not that Mary cannot ‘imagine’ what it is like to sense red but that "she would not know" (2) how red things look. I accept this argument, but not the next step. Jackson argues: "But if physicalism is true she would know; and no great powers of imagination would be called for." (3) There are two versions of physicalism: the first, against which Jackson has something to say, maintains that every instance of knowledge can be couched in third-person language. (4) But the assumption that physical information is solely what "you can tell" is not a necessary condition of physicalism. Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object :: Philosophy Papers Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically weak. Hence, we have no argument able to dismiss physicalism by consideration of first-person qualia (contra Jackson); however, it does not force us to endorse qualia-reductionism. In the second part of my paper I defend non-reductionism in a different way. Following Nagel and Harman, I try to avoid criticisms usually presented against Nagel, seeing subjectivity and objectivity as two complementary structures of the subjective and objective element of our language. I refer to classical German philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist dialectics which have developed a complementary approach cruc ial in the reductionist/anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of mind. "Opinion says hot and cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space." Democritus Jackson’s Black and White Mary (1) case illustrates an argument that our first-person experience of qualia provides knowledge not accessible through third-person means. This argument seems suspicious: if ‘knowledge’, by definition, needs to be grasped in third-person terms, it is inconceivable how an exclusively first-person experience may give us knowledge. Harman (92) develops complementarity of subjective and objective aspects within his functionalism of concepts. This notion needs to be extended to epistemic complementarity. I refer to Classical German Philosophy, Phenomenology and Marxism which have developed a complementary approach crucial in the reductionist anti-reductionist controversy in philosophy of mind. I. The Knowledge Argument As Jackson (86) emphasizes in his polemics with Churchland (85) the main point of the case of Black and White Mary is not that Mary cannot ‘imagine’ what it is like to sense red but that "she would not know" (2) how red things look. I accept this argument, but not the next step. Jackson argues: "But if physicalism is true she would know; and no great powers of imagination would be called for." (3) There are two versions of physicalism: the first, against which Jackson has something to say, maintains that every instance of knowledge can be couched in third-person language. (4) But the assumption that physical information is solely what "you can tell" is not a necessary condition of physicalism.